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Abstract 
 
This article theorises the interplay between public diplomacy and populism. Building on 
Baudrillard’s simulacra, we advance the hybridity approach to soft power statecraft by analysing a 
cultural shift in the US presidential public diplomacy. Using discourse analysis, we uncover how, 
rather than aiding the building of relationship with foreign publics, Donald Trump has brought to 
the field cultural codes alien to public diplomacy, imploding the meanings central to the 
endogenous norms of diplomacy, and turning towards agonistic relational dynamic with foreign 
publics. This article reveals how digitalisation affords the expansion of Donald Trump’s populist 
style, and makes populist cultural shift highly visible on his Twitter. To reveal this dynamic in 
granular details, we propose ‘kayfabe’ as an epistemic lens for the interpretation of the populist 
style in the conduct of Trump’s ‘simulated public diplomacy’, a defining feature of the current US 
global leadership. As well as considering socialities re-shaping relational dynamics, this article 
unpacks tensions stemming from the expansion of populist style into presidential public diplomacy. 
Finally, we reflect on epistemic crisis of the US public diplomacy within the strategic landscape of 
political uncertainties associated with the proliferation of populism in the field.  
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Introduction 
Over the past two decades, ‘new’ public diplomacy has been shaped by the logic of the management 
of relationships, a perspective originating in public relations theory (Melissen, 2005). By aligning 
the theories of public relations and public diplomacy, the management of communication 
underpinning the building of diplomatic relations has become central to the field of soft power 
statecraft, turning public diplomacy into a vital strategic function in advancing a state’s diplomatic 
goals. As such, ‘new’ public diplomacy has been focused on the building of relationship between a 
state and foreign publics, primarily to broaden the public appeal of its foreign policies. The 
communication strategies that this approach has favoured have intrinsically focused on generating 
positive public sentiments around a state and its principal diplomatic actors (Gilboa, 2008). 
However, in this article we examine the disruptive strategies that the 45th President of the United 
States (US), Donald Trump, has brought to public diplomacy, particularly through his adoption of 
Twitter as a conduit for personalised diplomatic communication and as an arena for his 
idiosyncratic style of populism. Trump’s use of Twitter seems to fly in the face of established 
communication norms for the practice of public diplomacy, and we critically analyse his tweets on 
diplomatic relations for their constitutive style in order to understand the nature and extent of the 
socialities defining this disruption.       
 
During the 2016 presidential election campaign Donald Trump advocated a revisionist approach to 
foreign policy articulated in a demotic and combative style that was alien to the norms of liberal 
governance that had been the linchpin of US soft power statecraft. Following his election to the 
White House, concerns about the decline of US soft power - that is its ability to “attract the publics 
of other countries” (Nye, 2008, p. 95) - signalled during the campaign have evolved into a focus on 
the notably populist turn in Trump’s diplomacy and statecraft. Furthermore, the under-investment of 
his administration in the traditional, formal channels of diplomacy has afforded Trump’s own 
Twitter feed an inevitably heightened significance among the tools for the articulation of US soft 
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power - with fewer diplomats and a side-lined State Department, international attention tends to 
turn to the President’s uninhibited tweets on foreign policy issues, shifting this informal channel 
into the center stage of public diplomacy. 
 
At the same time, the decline of US soft power in international politics has become a hallmark of 
Trump’s presidency: since its commencement, the world approval ratings for the US leadership 
have dropped from 48% in 2016 to 30% in 2018, leading Germany to replace the US as top-ranked 
power, and putting the US close to China and Russia at 31% and 27 % respectively (Gallop, 2018). 
Yet, any discussion of the consequences of Trump’s communication style is strategically absent in 
the State Department’s ‘2018 Comprehensive Annual Report on Public Diplomacy & International 
Broadcasting’, leaving us with the opportunity to address this gap and analyse the interplay between 
populism and public diplomacy. Given that the only recent empirical study exploring the links 
between these two elements focuses on the authoritarian Russia (Yablokov, 2015), we shift the 
analytical focus to a democratic political landscape. 
 
Against this backdrop, then, we ask what happens to public diplomacy, a communicative practice 
for the management of relationships with foreign publics (Zaharna et al., 2013), when it is 
performed by a high-profile populist leader? We reveal how Trump’s tweets articulate a radical 
reinvention of public diplomacy, which we have called simulated public diplomacy, wherein 
engagements with foreign publics are performed within the setting of a spectacular agonism that 
enhances the president’s persona as an alpha deal-maker and fêted ‘face’ for the purposes of 
national electioneering. Building on the work of Surowiec and Long (2020), we analyse dynamics 
that incites agonistic relationship dynamic between Trump and foreign publics. Extending the 
existing analysis of dimensions of hybridity in soft power statecraft, we explore hybrid media 
landscape-enabled cultural interplays, particularly between diplomatic culture and the populist style 
adapted into Trump’s presidential public diplomacy. This article therefore provides empirical 
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insights into the relationship between US public diplomacy and populism as performed by the US 
president.  
 
In what follows, we understand soft power statecraft as involving “the participatory conduct of 
foreign policy issues geared towards exerting influence and advancing state interests through 
engaging relevant networks at home and abroad, mobilising multiple sources and resources, 
utilising ‘older’ and ‘newer’ media, and enacting communicative practices such as, but not 
exclusively, public diplomacy to meet the aims of interdependent domestic and foreign policies” 
(Surowiec and Long (2020, p. 171). Inherent to the US field of soft power statecraft, public 
diplomacy is conceptualised as a managed communicative practice by an international actor that 
attempts “to advance the ends of policy by engaging with foreign publics” (Cowan and Cull, 2008, 
p. 6). 
 
 Soft power: presidencies, statecraft and public diplomacy 
We begin our theorisation of presidential public diplomacy by anchoring this polyphonic practice in 
hybrid media landscapes. We will argue that the logic of relationship building is being eroded in 
presidential public diplomacy and that this is mostly clearly visible in Trump’s tweets. We position 
our argument within the scholarship on the digitalisation of public diplomacy and the interplay of 
diplomatic culture with populism as a communicative phenomenon. 
 
From its conception, ‘soft power’, that is the ability of a diplomatic actor to get what it wants 
through attraction rather than coercion or payments, has been theorised in relation to US foreign 
policy (Nye, 2004). While the ability to use soft and hard power resources has become, in turn, 
central to US presidential leadership styles, theorising around the relationship between styles of 
leadership and soft power statecraft remains rare. Theorists of soft power acknowledge 
‘transformational’ and ‘transactional’ leadership as the two main styles of US presidencies:  
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We can distinguish leaders’ styles by how they use hard and soft power resources. I will use 
the terms “transactional style” to characterize the skills with which leaders manage their hard 
power resources and “inspirational style” to characterize leadership that rests more on soft 
power resources (Nye, 2014, p. 120).  
 
Based on binary categories, however, this typology is ontologically limiting. In global hybrid media 
landscapes, this classification is often poorly aligned with the soft power statecraft through which 
US leadership styles are articulated (Gilboa, 2008), highlighting the need for nuanced theorising 
concerning the manner in which can public diplomacy act as an expression of complex, hybridised, 
dynamic soft power leadership style.  
 
As a 2016 presidential candidate, Donald Trump, already noted for his unorthodox social media 
skills, used Twitter to disseminate campaign messages and to co-construct a media persona rooted 
in a clearly populist style (Enli, 2017). Given the leading role of the US in international politics, 
wide reporting of the populist elements of Trump’s presidential campaign undermined the 
legitimacy of the US state as a global leader relying on the promotion of liberal democracy as a 
resource of public diplomacy, and gave diplomatic actors worldwide the opportunity to learn about 
the potential future orientation of US foreign policies, soft power statecraft, and public diplomacy 
(Kluver et al., 2018).  
 
With the emergence of the ‘new’ public diplomacy paradigm, the field has conceived ‘relationship 
building’ as being at its heart. Borrowed from public relations research (Hayden, 2012; Surowiec 
2017), relationships and network metaphors have become cornerstones of public diplomacy 
taxonomies (Cull, 2008; Zaharna et al., 2013). This approach is echoed in studies of US presidential 
public diplomacy (Zhang and Meadows, 2012; Golan and Yang, 2013) and how it faces the 
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challenge of adapting the practice to hybrid media landscapes in which social media supplants 
traditional media (Chadwick, 2013) and leads to the inter-mediation (Guo and Vargo, 2017; Golan 
et al., 2019) of diplomacy. As such, recognition of this interconnectivity advances acceptance of the 
polyphonic architecture of the field, and how it engenders the entrance of new socialities into its 
practice, accelerating the re-shaping of public diplomacy by hybrid cultural forms. 
 
Trump’s presidential public diplomacy, however, appears less concerned with the building of 
relationships, and more with the construction of a populist discursive style exogenous to the cultural 
norms established in the practice. It seems, therefore, that public diplomacy is in ‘flux’, at the 
boundaries of the field of soft power statecraft. Our departure point for the contextualisation of 
Trump’s populist style is ‘negative soft power’ (Callahan, 2015), that is the orientation in statecraft 
that privileges domestic over foreign publics of diplomacy. Enabled by digitalization of the practice, 
including the affordances of social media platform (Manor, 2019), Trump’s use of Twitter re-invents 
cultural dynamics in the field by hybridising endogenous diplomatic norms with exogenous codes.  
 
US public diplomacy and Twitter 
 
The adoption of social media in US public diplomacy, sometimes dubbed ‘public diplomacy 2.0’ or 
‘twiplomacy’, dates back to 2008 (Milam and Avery, 2012; Zhong and Lu, 2013; Cull, 2013). 
Although the bulk of scholarly analysis of the digitalisation of public diplomacy focuses on the role 
of the State Department (Dodd and Collins, 2017; Duncombe, 2017), there has been some 
consideration of how it has effected presidential public diplomacy. Of particular relevance here is 
scholarship on the adoption of Twitter in US presidential public diplomacy. For example, Holland 
and Fermor (2017) argue that Trump uses Twitter for public diplomacy as an outlet for his 
frustrations with political leaders. Elsewhere, questioning Trump’s diplomatic code of conduct, 
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Šimunjak and Caliandro (2019) conclude that the language he uses on Twitter does not adhere to 
diplomatic norms.  
 
Without existing systematic analysis of the phenomonen, the classification of Trump’s Twitter as the 
principal tool for his presidential public diplomacy inevitably raises questions about his strategic 
approach to the practice. Trump’s Twitter, however, displays several clear features of public 
diplomacy: it has the ability to set news agenda on foreign policy issues (Holland and Fermor, 
2017); it has wide public appeal and engages foreign publics (Cull, 2016); it has the power to build 
the inter-media agenda for foreign publics (Guo and Vargo, 2017);  and, by the virtue of the 
interactive affordances of the platform, it possesses the relational dynamic central to ‘new’ and 
‘digital’ public diplomacy (Melissen; 2005; Manor, 2019).  
 
Yet, while Trumps’ tweeting can be framed in terms of the evolving normative understanding of the 
use of social media as an aid to relationship building in public diplomacy, there is also evidence of 
an emerging disruptive tendency. While we recognise the inherent disruptive possibilities of digital 
platforms, we argue that it is the socialites of diplomatic actors, Trump included, rather than 
Twitter’s technology itself, which are likely to be the true sources of disruption. We follow Manor’s 
(2018) call to examine ‘the social’ side of digitalisation, particularly the way that socialites are 
embodied as cultural codes (Van Dijk, 2013) emerging in the form of populist styles in public 
diplomacy. Accordingly, our study does not deviate from the relational paradigm, but rather 
uncovers strategies for relationship implosion in public diplomacy.  
 
Diplomatic culture meets populism 
 
While popular culture was embraced during the 2008 and 2012 elections, and, to an extent, 
normalised as a resource sustaining the celebrity status of the “Obama effect” in statecraft (Kellert, 
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2010; Golan and Yang, 2013), the proliferation of the populist style in public diplomacy is a recent 
phenomenon. Laying the foundations for ‘negative soft power’, the 2016 presidential campaign 
marked a shift towards cultural codes that foreground populism. Stolee and Canton (2018, p. 150) 
assert that Trump’s use of Twitter signalled “a shift in presidential rhetorical strategy from an 
address of a wide constituency (built on coalitions) to a core constituency (built on a base)”. 
Gaufman (2018) recognizes carnivalesque anti-elitist personalizations in Trump’s style, which was, 
in turn, conceptually aligned with the erosion of US soft power through his “appeals to bigotry and 
nativism; his evident dishonesty and contempt for democratic norms; the pervasive conflicts of 
interest and appearance of official corruption; the entire spectacle of the Trump presidency” 
(Brands, 2017, p. 27-28).  
 
While scholarship considers the interplay between ‘older’ and ‘newer’ media, and the populist 
zeitgeist, as a challenge for public diplomacy (Cooper, 2019), in order to theorise this proliferating 
populist dynamics we draw from the notion of diplomatic culture, “the accumulated communicative 
and representational norms, rules, and institutions devised to improve relations and avoid war 
between interacting and mutually recognizing political entities” (Wiseman, 2005, p. 409). This 
allows us to conceptualise our analysis of the populist cultural turn at the heart of recent US 
presidential public diplomacy. Trump tends not to consult his foreign policy team and instead of 
adhering to the codes of diplomatic culture in terms of using public diplomacy norms, he displays a 
propensity for tweeting spontaneously about foreign policy (Panke and Pethersohn, 2017). 
Furthermore, this conduct relies upon a media persona of a “deal-maker”, magnified through his 
delivery style on Twitter. We argue that by virtue of the prominence of his office, Trump is a central 
figure in the conduct of US soft power statecraft, and it is his style that makes his public diplomacy 
unique.   
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By definition, presidencies are prone to personalisation in the reporting of the US by foreign news 
(Balmas and Sheafer, 2013). Acknowledging social media as an enabler of personalisation 
strategies, Spry (2019) has discussed the manner in which personal styles emerge in managed 
communication about diplomats’ lives. With the advancement of digitalisation, social media enable 
engagement with foreign publics through localising (via the choice of topic) and personalising (via 
personal and informal narrative) strategies. According to Destradi and Plagemann (2019), the latest 
wave of populism in international politics reinforces this strategy in soft power statecraft as populist 
leaders tend to centralise and personalise foreign policies.  
 
In challenging endogenous diplomatic norms such as multilateralism, diplomatic protocol, security 
obligations, and non-discrimination, Trump instead uses a populist style that is “confrontational, 
chameleonic, culture-bound and context-dependent” (Arter, 2010, p. 490). In our analysis, we 
approach populism as a ‘phenomenon’. As such, it can be understood as “content”, referring to 
ideologies (such as people-centrism and anti-elitism) and a characteristic set of key messages or 
frames, or it can be considered “as style”, where the expression of populism is “often associated 
with the use of a characteristic set of presentational style elements” (De Vreese et al., 2018, p. 425). 
The proliferation of Trump’s style across traditional and social media is having a profound effect on 
the ‘style’ of US public diplomacy, displaying a dynamic interplay between endogenous and 
exogenous cultural codes that needs to be empirically captured and adequately theorised. 
 
Methodologies 
This analysis is embedded in post-modern approaches to the study of international politics. From 
this stance, hybrid media landscapes in which US public diplomacy is practised intensifies changes 
to its cultural dynamics. Our aim is to explore how Trump’s populist style, emergent in public 
diplomacy messages, yields hybridisation effects, namely a borrowing and blending between 
cultures, where new, incoherent and heterogeneous cultural forms that stem from practice emerge in 
 
10 
 
trans-local spaces. Consequently, we ask and answer the following questions about his public 
diplomacy:  
  
RQ1. What cultural codes, exogenous to public diplomacy, emerge on Trump’s Twitter? 
 
RQ2. How do these differ from the endogenous cultural codes of the White House’s public 
diplomacy? 
 
RQ3. What is the interplay between endogenous and exogenous cultural codes underpinning 
Trump’s approach to public diplomacy? 
 
We adopt discourse analysis (Simonsen, 2019) to explore the hybridisation effects engendered by 
Trump. Our analysis follows the polyphonic rationalities explicit in public diplomacy as a practice 
reliant upon multiple genres for traditional and social media circulation. To explore this, our 
assemblage comprises a sample of the White House’s edited news releases (n=21) and unedited 
tweets (n=306) mined from the ‘Trump Twitter Archive’ website. We sampled items spanning from 
the point of Trump’s appointment as the President to the start of data collection (20 January 2017 to 
8 July 2019), and focused on the conduct of his public diplomacy towards seven states with which 
the US has a variety of established diplomatic relations: France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Poland, 
the United Kingdom, and Venezuela. The functionalities of the aforementioned website, which 
archives the ‘@realDonaldTrump’ account, enabled the accurate sorting of tweets. The selection of 
the White House’s news releases followed the criteria of time and location. All data was digitally 
archived and coded manually by the two researchers using criteria refined in three test trials. 
Following the procedure for qualitative studies (MacPhail et. al., 2016), a strong inter-coder 
reliability was established (Agreement = 77.5%; Kappa = 0.997). The procedure of inter-coder-
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reliability for qualitative analysis was conducted to ensure systematicity in data handling, 
transparency of coding, critical dialogue and reflexivity in analysis (O’Connor and Joffee, 2020). 
At the data analysis stage, we reduced the assemblage using the cultural codes of populist styles 
systematised by Wettstein et. al (2019) as well as by identifying themes underpinning them. In line 
with research on populism (De Vreese et al., 2018), we traced the occurrences of particular variety 
of populist style in the content of Trump’s messages. Analysis enabled us to isolate patterns in the 
President’s stylistic toolkit created, on the one hand, from traditional media strategies and, on the 
other hand, through the affordances of Twitter. Two procedures guided the analysis of our findings: 
foregrounded (lexical) categories that re-style presidential public diplomacy and backgrounded 
(functional) categories exploring the cultural significance of his statements for US public diplomacy 
(Wodak and Reisigl, 2001). 
 
 
Findings overview 
 
 
The results of our coding demonstrate that Trump’s tweets that pronounce upon matters of foreign 
policy or that appear to be directed toward foreign publics articulate a populist-styled simulation of 
public diplomacy, where caricatures of relationships with foreign leaders and publics are drawn 
with an eye to personalised, agonistic positioning. This simulation is a manifestation of negative 
soft power statecraft inspired by Trump’s domestic base rather than operating to maintain 
advantageous relationships with foreign publics. Its focus is “the production of values both at home 
and abroad” through the “exclusion of Otherness” (Callahan, 2015, p. 217-219). Furthermore, the 
values that Trump’s tweets convey are themselves vehicles of personal epideictic – communicating 
a form of individual exceptionalism through a repetitive lexicon of simplification and statements 
designed to amplify the emotional effects of his self-narration.  
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Our analysis concludes that Trump’s tweeting practice can be understood as enabled by a global 
hybrid media landscape (Guo and Vargo, 2017), a powerful amalgamation of ‘old’ and ‘new’ media 
techne. We find this hybridity mirrored in Trump’s intense blending of cultural codes, re-mixing 
diplomatic codes with performance-oriented signalling in the drive for self-celebration and self-
justification. Engagement with foreign leaders, participation in diplomatic events and media 
spectacles are presented in Trump’s tweets in terms of what they mean for him, how they reflect 
upon his abilities, and his persona. The dialogical interactivity that microblogging platforms such as 
Twitter have often been lauded as encouraging is largely eschewed by Trump who uses it to 
broadcast the carnivalesque performance of his persona to the world.   
 
Since Trump’s ascendancy into the field, the dynamics of hybridisation have taken unexpected, 
rupturing and disruptive turns. We find that Trump’s public diplomacy rests on cultural 
hybridisation, and intensifies hyper-reality, a contemporary reaction to the gamut of broadcast 
modes, social media and the ways in which they intersect with each other. Baudrillard’s (2001) 
hyper-reality is useful in theorising cultural codes in public diplomacy, and we have sought to 
provide a fine level of granularity in reporting of cultural codes manifested in Trump’s public 
diplomacy, for example, as simulated conflict, simulated friendships or simulated facts.  
 
Our results also indicate that the traditional venue for the creation and dissemination of US public 
diplomacy, the White House Press Office, has largely remained stylistically and strategically 
untouched by Trump’s simulation of public diplomacy. While any inclusion of the President’s 
reported speech in WHPO material must inevitably carry strong elements of his unique style and 
performative approach, it is noticeable that, so far, the traditional routes of official public diplomacy 
largely maintain their endogenous cultural codes. Trump’s influence here is small. Whether this 
signifies the resilience of those endogenous codes or a lack of Presidential interest in such formal 
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communication remains unclear. We present our findings in detail, organised according to their 
relevance for each of our research questions.  
 
 
RQ1. What cultural codes, exogenous to public diplomacy, emerge on Trump’s Twitter? 
 
 
Our coding of Trump’s public diplomacy Twitter messages reveals that the dominant discursive 
features were ‘simplified language and syntax’ (code 6), followed by ‘social literacy’ (code 8), 
‘narrating the self’ (code 1), ‘emotional amplification’ (code 10) and ‘faces and heels’ (code 3). All 
of these are exogenous codes to public diplomacy. Trump’s tweets display a use of language which, 
in comparison to the norms of the practice, is markedly simplified at both the semantic and 
syntactical levels. In our coding glossary we explained ‘simplified language and syntax’ (code 6) as 
‘evidence of a limited stylistic and lexical palette’ and evincing ‘immature communication patterns 
(e.g. accusations, childish hyperbole, tantrums)’. Such cultural codes are foreign to public 
diplomacy, which strives to be balanced, neutral and mature. Language is the principal modality of 
public diplomacy and its considered use is a central tenet of diplomatic culture. The dominating 
presence of code 6 across Trump’s tweets illustrates just how unorthodox his style is.  
 
By the way when the helicopter couldn’t fly to the first cemetery in France because of 
almost zero visibility I suggested driving. Secret Service said NO too far from airport & 
big Paris shutdown. Speech next day at American Cemetery in pouring rain! Little 
reported-Fake News! 
Tweet #11 (11-13-2018) 
 
This tweet from 2018 demonstrates the characteristics covered by code 6. Firstly, it is a pre-emptive 
defence against the potential media criticism of the cancellation of Trump’s visit to a WWI 
cemetery 80 miles outside of Paris due to bad weather. The meat of the tweet is concerned with 
shifting the blame away from himself, casting his actions in a positive light. This is then followed 
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with a complaint against the media for not reporting his speech in the pouring rain at another 
cemetery. The rapid shifting of blame and finger-pointing, much of it uttered in telegraphic 
language (Brown and Fraser, 1963) with frequent use of exclamation points and ALL CAPS 
typifies the petulant, ego-driven style that we can see again in Tweet #222.  
 
Working on major Trade Deal with the United Kingdom. Could be very big & exciting. 
JOBS! The E.U. is very protectionist with the U.S. STOP! 
Tweet # 222 (07-25-2017) 
 
The tweets above are, of course, public. In a global hybrid media landscape this means that they 
represent immediate Presidential address to the entire world, communication that is instantly able to 
be machine translated, re-tweeted, re-posted, discussed, and evaluated by publics around the globe. 
The injunction at the end of Tweet #222 is a command directly given to the EU, while the 
exclamation “JOBS!” appears to be an emotional signal to a US public to prepare for the 
employment opportunities that will come from his “major Trade Deal” with the UK. Could Trump 
really be talking to ‘the EU’ in this tweet at the same time as communicating with his domestic 
base? Or is it more likely that the appeal to “STOP!” is a performative apostrophe, censuring the 
EU for rhetorical effect with a domestic public who would naturally react against any form of anti-
US protectionism? This is an indication that Trump’s simplicity of language is not a marker of a 
lack of sophistication in rhetorical strategy. Rather, if we see this as a tweet talking to his own 
domestic base then the hybridisation of telegraphic language and classical apostrophe becomes far 
more revealing. Indeed, Trump’s simplistic language can be interpreted as framing his messaging as 
quick ‘insider’ bullet points dashed off to his loyal followers in hastily stolen moments. They 
contribute to the simulation of speed and importance when received by a sympathetic reader.  
 
It is unsurprising that instances of what we have identified as ‘social literacy’ (code 8) also 
dominate the Twitter assemblage. This coding reflects Trump’s facility with the affordances of 
amplification on social media – hashtags, handles, retweets, embedded media, and links.     
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In Alaska with our GREAT TROOPS departing shortly for Japan! 
https://t.co/9a72TMftpN 
Tweet #140 (05-25-2019) 
 
The compressed link here embeds a 30 second video of Trump with a group of US military in 
Alaska which provides an opportunity for Trump to provide his own news segment with a straight-
to-camera address. Underlining Trump’s broadcast strategy, we see how the apparently dialogical 
affordances of the micro-blogging platform can be re-purposed to produce monological ‘personal’ 
updates to a sympathetic base. As a further example of this, Trump often uses retweeting to 
strengthen his family network, amplifying the voices of Melania and Ivanka Trump while 
strengthening the dynastic momentum of the Trump brand: 
 
RT @IvankaTrump: Touched by the warm hospitality of Prime Minister Abe and the 
Japanese people. ありがとうございます [Thank you]! Until next time 🇯🇵… 
Tweet #188 (11-04-2017) 
 
Trump’s use of hashtags and handles magnifies the exposure of his tweets. Since its inception, 
public diplomacy has relied upon ‘old’ media (Cowan and Cull, 2008) to convey its messages, but it 
has often been important for the source of public diplomacy to appear to be one step removed from 
efforts to amplify the message, displaying a decorum inherited from the formal codes of diplomacy. 
Trump’s use of Twitter, however, explicitly embraces all of the platform’s amplification power, 
revelling in the potential increase of public reach. As Trump’s many competitive public statements 
around ‘ratings’ demonstrate, the search for an ever-wider base is perhaps the one constant 
motivation displayed by his persona because it is how he appears to perceive success. In this sense, 
we note that while his target public for foreign policy pronouncements on Twitter is his domestic 
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base he is just as happy to catch the attention of wider non-US publics who might potentially 
support his ideas – as his use of Japanese in the above quote indicates.  
 
How exactly, though, does Trump address these established and potential publics?  Code 1, 
‘narrating the self’, suggests that self-presentation drives Trump’s tweeting. Much of his simulated 
public diplomacy messaging reveals low-level description of what he is doing or planning to do.  
 
Played golf today with Prime Minister Abe of Japan and @TheBig_Easy Ernie Els and 
had a great time. Japan is very well represented! 
Tweet #182 (02-11-2017) 
 
I have arrived in Scotland and will be at Trump Turnberry for two days of meetings 
calls and hopefully some golf - my primary form of exercise! The weather is beautiful 
and this place is incredible! Tomorrow I go to Helsinki for a Monday meeting with 
Vladimir Putin. 
Tweet #228 (07-14-2018) 
 
These two tweets illustrate the diary-like relationship Trump has with his Twitter feed. Public 
micro-blogs can exist on a continuum between quotidian records of an ‘ordinary day’ to highly 
confessional self-explorations (Bortree, 2005). Trump swings to the side of what Blood (2002, p. 1) 
describes as an “endless stream of blurts about the writer’s day”. These ‘blurts’ are carefully chosen 
to advance Trump’s self-presentation as a powerful man mixing with powerful people, so that his 
ordinary day becomes extraordinary. Once more we see the negative soft power in Trump’s 
interface with foreign actors and publics – engagement with the world outside the US is portrayed 
as an entertaining mix of whirlwind, high stakes power plays rewarded by 5-star leisure activities 
filtered through the lens of ‘Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous’. In both tweets above we note the 
way Trump uses these ‘blurts’ to slip in simple flattery to foreign publics of the states he visits. As a 
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performing ‘face’ he looks for an opportunity to attract regard, whether from established or 
prospective supporters and his self-narration constantly works to generate such opportunities.   
 
Amplification of the emotional resonance of his tweets (code 10) is another dominant theme in 
Trump’s Twitter discourse. Usually, such amplification is achieved through displays of his own 
emotional reactions to events, people, or situations. For example:  
 
At least 7 dead and 48 wounded in terror attack and Mayor of London says there is "no 
reason to be alarmed!" 
Tweet #255 (06-04-2017) 
 
So horrible to watch the massive fire at Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris. Perhaps flying 
water tankers could be used to put it out. Must act quickly! 
Tweet #49 (04-15-2019) 
 
Fear is an explicit emotion favoured by Trump in his amplification strategies. Displays of fear 
follow the need for urgent reactions and therefore galvanize his publics around a particular course 
of action. In both of the above tweets it is possible to interpret Trump’s words as addressing the 
people of London and Paris consecutively. In tweet #255 the intent would seem to be to express 
disbelief that the Mayor of London could deny the need to be alarmed – and, naturally, the people 
that would have the most reason to be alarmed from the attack would be the people of London. 
Similarly, the people that would have the most to gain from Trump’s suggestion would be the 
people of Paris. And, certainly, Trump’s apparent concern in both tweets could be interpreted as a 
form of concern for the well-being of those publics and their environment. Yet they can also be 
interpreted as performances directed at US publics whom Trump wishes to continue to alarm 
regarding the immediacy of Islamic terrorist threats (in the case of Tweet #255) and to vicariously 
demonstrate his quick-thinking and agile response to emergency situations (#49).  
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At the same time, we find that Trump is quick to display an opposing emotion, hope, particularly 
when it comes to the outcomes of his deal-making and pursuit of personal relationships with foreign 
leaders.  
 
Going to New York. Will be with Prime Minister Abe of Japan tonight talking Military 
and Trade. We have done much to help Japan would like to see more of a reciprocal 
relationship. It will all work out! 
Tweet #152 (09-23-2018) 
 
America is proud to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Poland in the fight to eradicate the 
evils of terrorism and extremism. #POTUSinPoland https://t.co/MHxRmVvtsh 
Tweet #201 (07-06-2017) 
 
The last tweet here is more traditional in styling and evinces pride derived from a relationship with 
an ally, a modality endogenous to public diplomacy. Indeed, as we describe below, there are clear 
instances across the assemblage where cultural codes are historically associated with the discourse 
of ‘nation speaking unto nation’, featured either momentarily or in a more sustained rally. This 
reveals Trumpian hybridisation – traditional diplomatic language norms, national sentiments, social 
media stylings, self-promoting branding language, and cartoon-esque vilification all mix together in 
a fluid, protean stream of adaptive style that produces a simulation of public diplomacy. 
 
Arguably, the most basic tactic of negative soft power is the generation of an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ 
narrative, “drawing symbolic borders between self and Other” (Callahan, 2015, p. 219). We find 
this a core aspect of Trump’s populist style, evidenced in the ‘faces and heels’ coding (code 3). 
Enemies provide Trump with targets for his emotional amplification and clear points of 
differentiation used for his own self-narration, whereas allies bolster his reputation, his reach and, 
by proxy, serve to describe the codes of the Trumpian paradigm.     
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It was a pleasure to host my friends President Andrzej Duda and Mrs. Agata 
Kornhauser-Duda of Poland at the @WhiteHouse today. U.S.-Poland ties are at an all-
time high. Thank you for being such an exemplary Ally! https://t.co/tvhHIpsrFo 
Tweet #195 (06-13-2019) 
 
I ask every member of the Maduro regime: End this nightmare of poverty hunger and 
death. LET YOUR PEOPLE GO. Set your country free! Now is the time for all 
Venezuelan Patriots to act together as one united people. Nothing could be better for the 
future of Venezuela! 
Tweet #283 (02-18-2019) 
 
@SadiqKhan who by all accounts has done a terrible job as Mayor of London has been 
foolishly “nasty” to the visiting President of the United States by far the most important 
ally of the United Kingdom. He is a stone cold loser who should focus on crime in 
London not me...... 
Tweet #213 (-6-03-2019) 
 
These tweets illustrate the range covered by our ‘faces and heels’ coding. States such as Poland, 
political regimes, or single people (i.e. Sadiq Khan), are presented by Trump as faces or heels, 
actors to be applauded or booed. Mirroring formats of staged entertainment, it is an agonistic 
spectacle of struggle designed to incite the public. This simulated conflict also dependents upon 
praise for allies and team mates. Poland is a praiseworthy ally, the Maduro regime is an object of 
concerted opprobrium, and Sadiq Khan is a “stone cold loser” whose competence as a mayor is 
ridiculed in front of Trump’s followers. While statements such as that regarding Poland in Tweet 
#195 are endogenous to public diplomacy, the biblical harangues of Trump’s tweets against Maduro 
and the personalised invective heaped upon Khan are exogenous to it. They are, however, extreme 
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instances of the Self/Other signalling that Callahan (2015) describes as typical of negative soft 
power gambits. It is, indeed, this extreme articulation that marks Trump’s negative soft power 
statecraft as markedly different from, say, China’s or other authoritarian political regimes. This 
extremity is a mark of his populist approach to the simulation of public diplomacy. 
 
 
In a related manner to Trump’s construction of faces and heels, the assemblage contains evidence of 
the President translating diplomatic relationships into the personal realm (code 4). Diplomatic 
dinners are framed as personal nights-out with friends, and foreign leaders are portrayed as golf-
buddies, all of which are events that are worth self-reporting for public consumption: 
 
Great day with Prime Minister @AbeShinzo of Japan. We played a quick round of golf 
by the beautiful Potomac River while talking Trade and many other subjects. He has 
now left for Japan and I am on my way to Wisconsin where a very large crowd of 
friends await! https://t.co/ZvyxJ8sIw2 
Tweet #146 (04-27-2019) 
 
Such personalisation can manifest itself as a form of behind-the-scenes gossip casting Trump as a 
wise man whose advice is sometimes foolishly disregarded –  
 
I have been very critical about the way the U.K. and Prime Minister Theresa May 
handled Brexit. What a mess she and her representatives have created. I told her how it 
should be done but she decided to go another way. I do not know the Ambassador but he 
is not liked or well.... 
Tweet #260 (07-08-2019) 
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Public diplomacy has traditionally not excessively personalised its discourse. There are exceptions, 
of course, such as Robert Kennedy in 1962’s ‘Goodwill Tour’ (Shannon, 2013) or Barack Obama’s 
engagement strategy (Golan and Yang, 2013), but even then the emphasis was on simple positive 
associations. Trump’s focus, however, is on the construction of faces and heels to heighten tension 
for the purpose of spectacle. Such codes are endogenous to platforms for strategically devised 
public spectacles such as wrestling and yellow journalism, and Trump’s use of them underlines his 
facility in constructing the spectacular simulation of public diplomacy.  
 
 
RQ2. How do these differ from the endogenous cultural codes of the White House’s public 
diplomacy? 
 
If Trump’s tweeting about foreign policy and international actors generates a simulation of public 
diplomacy, how far has that simulation worked its way into the communication styles of White 
House press releases? Are the endogenous codes of US public diplomacy under threat from Trump’s 
personal voice? Our coding of the press releases reveals a number of insights in this regard.  
 
Firstly, although the press releases do contain instances of the codes we find dominant in our 
assemblage of Trump’s tweets, even the most regularly discovered code 1 (‘narrating the self’) 
occurs only in a quarter of paragraphs. There is therefore a significant difference in the cultural 
codes displayed by the White House press releases and Trump’s simulated public diplomacy tweets.  
 
Secondly, the most dominant code in the Twitter assemblage (‘simplified language and syntax’, 
code 6) is likewise present in the press release assemblage. However, on inspection we observe that 
this is due to a single press release containing a transcription of Trump’s Q&A session at the 2019 
G20 Summit in Osaka. Accordingly, although this particular press release is distributed through the 
formal public diplomacy channels of the White House, it represents more authentically Trumps’ 
exogenous voice in the same way that his tweets do.  
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Thirdly, we note state-dependant similarities of codes across the assemblage. This is most obvious 
in the case of Venezuela where we identify a prominent use of codes 3, 9, 7, and 10 across tweets 
and press releases. When dealing with the 2019 Maduro crisis, Trumps’ public diplomacy tweets 
display a distinct cultural code-switching (Nilep, 2006) between antagonistic appeals and an 
absolutist lexicon of a formal, almost archaic prosody. These features can also be found in the press 
releases on the crisis in Venezuela.  
 
Fourthly, the occurrence of ‘teams and dynasties’ (code 11) has, proportionately, a more dominant 
presence in the press releases than it does among tweets. The source of this dominance is the strong 
presence of Melania Trump’s duties in foreign visits reported by the White House. Trump’s tweets 
do refer to Melania accompanying him to diplomatic events, but these instances are far less 
dominant when compared to her presence in the press releases.  
 
When analysing the press releases on a state-by-state basis, the absence of the exogenous codes that 
we find in Trump’s tweets is notable. The dominant White House press release style is formal and 
informative. Trump’s voice and populist stylings are underplayed in the press releases, unless they 
are directly reported. The endogenous codes of public diplomacy have been heavily shaped by the 
established cultural codes of diplomacy and statecraft such as “the use of force only as a last resort, 
transparency, continuous dialogue, multilateralism, and civility” (Wiseman, 2005, p. 409) which 
have their roots in the ritualised behaviour of professional diplomatic culture (Sennett, 2012).  We 
find that while the endogenous codes of public diplomacy continue to dominate over Trump’s 
hybridised epideictic discourse, those codes can be easily influenced by any necessity to include the 
President’s direct voice. Statements such as those found in a press release announcing the US 
delegates to be sent to Strasbourg are studiously neutral in their informativeness: 
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President Donald J. Trump today announced the designation of a Presidential 
Delegation to Strasbourg, France and Speyer, Germany to attend the Funeral of Dr. 
Helmut J. M. Kohl, Former German Chancellor and Citizen of Honor of Europe on July 
1, 2017. 
(Corpus ID: Germany_30_6_2017)   
 
Yet, when the press release includes a report of what Trump says rather than what he did as the 
“diplomat-in-chief”, the endogenous codes of civility, multilateralism, transparency and dialogue 
become overpowered by the exogenous codes omnipresent on Twitter. The exchange between 
Trump and Merkel at the 2019 G20 in Osaka is illustrative of this: 
 
PRESIDENT TRUMP: Thank you very much. It’s great to be with Chancellor Merkel, a 
friend of mine — a great friend of mine. And we’ve had a terrific relationship. [...] 
And we have many things to talk about, and we have a long meeting scheduled. And 
we’ll be spending some time later on together also. But I just want to say she’s a 
fantastic person, a fantastic woman, and I’m glad to have her as a friend. 
And thank you very much, Angela. Thank you. 
(Corpus ID: Germany_28_6_2019) 
 
Trump’s words contrast with the way in which Merkel herself talks in response to Trump: 
 
We’re going to talk about international issues, the developments on the international 
front too, especially about what has been happening in West Africa.  We will be also 
talking about counterterrorism, and I very much look forward to that exchange.  Of 
course, Iran will also be on our agenda today. 
(Corpus ID: Germany_28_6_2019) 
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Merkel eschews the exogenous codes of Trump’s hybridised spectacle, echoing instead the 
endogenous codes of neutrality and informativeness. What is happening at the press conference is 
different for each leader. Trump’s words continue the exogenous focus on personal epideictic, 
portrayal of international relations as personal network, and repetitive, simplified syntax.  
 
A parallel example outlines the commitment to “mutually beneficial trade” between the US and 
Japan arising from the Summit between Trump and Abe in late 2018. Despite consistent Twitter 
portrayal of a personable relationship between him and the Japanese Prime Minister, Trump also 
tweets about the necessity for a “bilateral deal with Japan that is based on the principle of fairness 
and reciprocity” (Tweet #158), opining that Japan “has hit us hard on trade for years” (Tweet #168) 
and that the “massive $100 Billion Trade Deficit” is “not fair or sustainable” (Tweet #169). In the 
September 2018 press release, we see Trump’s terms largely shorn of their complaints, focusing 
instead on mutual agreement on terms: 
 
On the occasion of our Summit Meeting in New York on September 26, 2018, we, 
President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, affirmed the importance of 
a strong, stable, and mutually beneficial trade and economic relationship between the 
United States and Japan, recognizing that our economies together represent 
approximately 30 percent of global Gross Domestic Product. The President reiterated 
the importance of reciprocal trade, as well as reducing the trade deficit with Japan and 
other countries. The Prime Minister emphasized the importance of free, fair, and rules-
based trade. 
(Corpus ID: Japan_26_8_18)     
 
 
25 
 
The endogenous codes of civility, transparency and dialogue manage to smother the tones of 
Trump’s protests, though not entirely. The exogenous code that we have dubbed ‘the deal-maker’ 
(code 12), epideictically presenting Trump as a negotiator nonpareil, plays a muted but significant 
role here, and the wording of the press release echoes Trump’s personal pronouncements, framing 
the US-Japan agreement as a deal-making win for the President. 
 
RQ3. What is the interplay between endogenous and exogenous cultural codes underpinning 
Trump’s approach to public diplomacy? 
 
 
Despite claims (Robertson, 2018) that social media is a ‘disruptive technology’, we find that it is 
Trump’s style which threatens to disrupt the US public diplomacy, not any advantageous use of the 
innate affordances of Twitter. Trump’s style is defined by his use of cultural codes exogenous to 
traditional US approaches to the articulation of soft power. It is a style built for domestic 
electioneering in a highly divided nation and as such, when extended to Presidential rhetoric 
ostensibly engaging with foreign policy and foreign publics, it establishes a disruptive tension 
within public diplomacy messaging. One of the most obvious sites of this tension is in the 
contradiction between a Presidential rhetoric which produces negative soft power focused on 
defining the Trumpian vision of the US for a domestic public and the tradition of US public 
diplomacy concerned with generating positive US soft power with foreign publics. Accordingly, we 
identify four ways in which Trump’s simulation disrupts the practice of US public diplomacy:    
 
1. Populist agonism 
If balance and consideration of others are endogenous to the field, Trump disregards these codes. 
Instead of courtesy, positive statements, moderation, and ambiguity, his confrontational style 
overshadows his public diplomacy. This pattern is illustrated by the wide-spread proliferation of 
exogenous cultural code resting on ‘simplified language and syntax’ (code 6) and present in both 
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Twitter and in the White House news releases. Defined by simplified grammar, exclamations, 
simplistic sloganeering, ‘ALL CAPS’, colloquialisms, limited stylistic and lexical palette, and the 
proliferation of antagonistic communication patterns. So, while adaptability can be highly 
advantageous in soft power statecraft (Surowiec and Long, 2020), Trump’s use of Twitter illustrates 
an unusually rapid and dynamic code switching within the settings of public diplomacy. 
 
 
2. The spectacle of the personal 
Our analysis reveals that the central role of the President in public diplomacy is less about 
personalisation techniques, but more about the spectacle of the personal. While Golan and Yang 
(2013) identify the mediated personality of Barack Obama as an endogenous asset for US public 
diplomacy, in the case of Trump we find that the spectacle of ‘the personal’ rests on Trump’s 
assumed role as a public diplomat (self-narrating), his identity as the President (arena setter) and the 
content of his messages. As “diplomat-in-chief” he relies on the endogenous, historical legacy of 
public diplomacy such as the ‘touring Europe’ trope, but uses it for, epideictic self-narration:   
 
London part of trip is going really well. The Queen and the entire Royal family have 
been fantastic. The relationship with the United Kingdom is very strong. Tremendous 
crowds of well wishers and people that love our Country. Haven’t seen any protests yet 
but I’m sure the.... 
Tweet #210 (06-03-2019) 
 
While this self-narration is enabled by Twitter’s affordances, Trump’s ‘touring’ is reported by the 
White House too. For instance, the press release following his 2017 trip to Poland reports: 
 
The President then traveled to Hamburg, Germany where he attended the G20 summit. 
On day one of the event, he met with President Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico, 
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emphasizing the strong bilateral relationship that the United States enjoys with Mexico 
and discussed regional challenges, including drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and 
the crisis in Venezuela.  
(Corpus ID: Poland_11_7_2017) 
 
As part of simulating the archetype of a ‘family man’, Trump brings his personal ‘golfing’ 
experience closer to the publics of diplomacy, and opens access to private events: 
 
A working dinner tonight with Prime Minister Abe of Japan and his representatives at 
the Winter White House (Mar-a-Lago). Very good talks! 
Tweet #181 (02-11-2017) 
 
 
Had a very good phone call with @EmmanuelMacron President of France. Discussed 
various subjects in particular Security and Trade. Many other calls and conversations 
today. Looking forward to dinner tonight with Tim Cook of Apple. He is investing big 
dollars in U.S.A. 
Tweet #21 (08-10-2018) 
 
The publics of such ‘twiplomatic broadcasts’ are afforded opportunities to vicariously participate in 
private diplomatic events. This ‘zooming’ into the micro-personal level of diplomatic events 
accelerates foreign affairs into the realm of “the politics of immanence” (Braidotti, 2018, p. 21).  
 
The ‘spectacle of the personal’ blurs the focus over whose interests - personal or national - 
presidential public diplomacy articulates. Trump’s reliance on ‘deal-maker’ (code 12) and ‘common 
touch’ sensibilities (code 7) refocuses the conduct of foreign affairs from diplomatic negotiations to 
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corporate execution. Given that Trump is the centrepiece of public diplomacy, the hype surrounding 
the Presidential persona moves such endogenous personalisation techniques (Golan and Yang, 
2013) into an exogenous ‘personality cult’. As such, Trump’s simulation of public diplomacy 
discourse reveals the personality cult as a sui generis mixture of: male-gendered domineering 
corporate executive leadership, legitimacy by ‘popular’ sovereignty, targeting of entire populations 
as opposed to relevant foreign publics, an extensive use of media, and a style that exists in order to 
control the media enough to inhibit the introduction of rival cults (Plamper, 2012).   
 
 
3. Public diplomacy as extension of domestic politics 
While research reveals (Bjola and Manor, 2018) that digitalisation blurs the boundaries between 
‘domestic’ and ‘international’ realms of politics, we find that Trump’s simulated public diplomacy is 
a direct extension of US domestic politics. As well as appealing to his ‘base’, our coding reveals 
that in the settings of public diplomacy, Trump operates in a national electioneering mode. This is 
substantiated by the presence of codes such as ‘narrating the self’ (code 1), ‘media spectacle’ (code 
3), ‘simplified language’ (code 6), ‘common touch’ (code 7), and ‘fighting outside of the ring’ (code 
13), which display discursive features that have been found in his 2016 campaigning (Enli, 2017). 
Further, Trump de-contextualises public diplomacy and uses it to re-frame domestic politics: 
 
Wow! -Senator Mark Warner got caught having extensive contact with a lobbyist for a 
Russian oligarch. Warner did not want a “paper trail” on a “private” meeting (in 
London) he requested with Steele of fraudulent Dossier fame. All tied into Crooked 
Hillary. 
Tweet #250 (02-09-2018) 
 
 
Similarly, the codes used during his 2016 electioneering appear in his public diplomacy: 
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The Democrats are pushing for Universal HealthCare while thousands of people are 
marching in the UK because their system is going broke and not working. Dems want to 
greatly raise taxes for really bad and non-personal medical care. No thanks! 
Tweet #227 (02-05-2018) 
 
Trump uses the format of election campaign rallies to make statements about foreign affairs.  An 
extensive use of appeals to ‘the people’ (code 7) appears in his messages:  
 
After a great rally in Panama City Beach Florida - I am returning to Washington D.C. 
with @SenRickScott and Senator @MarcoRubio discussing the terrible abuses by 
Maduro. America stands with the GREAT PEOPLE of Venezuela for however long it 
takes! https://t.co/KcBoNfEibv 
Tweet 274 (05-09-2019) 
 
A defining feature of Trump’s 2016 campaign, and a hallmark of his populist style, diatribes against 
broadcast and print media continue in his public diplomacy: 
 
I have a great relationship with Angela Merkel of Germany but the Fake News Media 
only shows the bad photos (implying anger) of negotiating an agreement - where I am 
asking for things that no other American President would ask for! 
https://t.co/Ib97nN5HZ 
Tweet #223 (06-15-2018) 
 
This focus on domestic politics even when dealing with foreign actors, issues, and publics is a 
defining feature of Callahan’s (2015) definition of negative soft power.   
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4. Not ‘media effects’ but ‘reality effects’ 
The disruptive pattern that spans across all of the above trends indicates that Trump’s form of 
negative soft power is less about ‘media effects’ and more concerned with ‘reality effects’. As such, 
he has transformed public diplomacy practice into a simulation by using self-referential codes used 
to challenge entire realms of foreign affairs, particular policies of foreign leaders, or the value of 
individual politicians:  
 
On Trade France makes excellent wine but so does the U.S. The problem is that France 
makes it very hard for the U.S. to sell its wines into France and charges big Tariffs 
whereas the U.S. makes it easy for French wines and charges very small Tariffs. Not fair 
must change! 
Tweet 46 (11-13-2018) 
 
The petulant tone that signs-off this tweet acts as an exogenous raspberry in the face of traditional 
well-mannered diplomatic equanimity. Yet it also serves to re-frame such traditions as useless, 
unreal, masking by appealing to a basic, indeed child-like, belief in the simple ‘fairness’ of the 
world that has been put aside in favour of nuanced, adult, complex relationship-building. This 
single tweet exemplifies how carefully Trump plays with reality – he both casts the issue in terms of 
a childlike appeal to fairness while also placing himself in the position of the adult who has come 
into the room to put things right again.    
 
LONDON needs a new mayor ASAP. Khan is a disaster - will only get worse! 
https://t.co/n7qKI3BbD2 
Tweet #243 (06-15-2019) 
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What does London mean for Trump here? There is no sense that it is the capital city of an ally – 
instead it becomes a flat, transient placeholder for any place that is not being run in a Trumpian 
way. The diplomatic consequences of the President of the United States personally interfering in the 
municipal politics of an ally are never considered because that is not what is happening – instead, 
Khan and the city of London have simply become simulated ‘versions’ of themselves, serving as 
characters in the President’s own arena of total campaigning. Foreign publics, foreign issues, 
foreign leaders are all simply resources to be dynamically purposed and re-purposed into 
components of an agonistic spectacle that has re-election as its goal. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Intensifying Baudrillard’s (2001) hyper-reality, hybrid media landscapes enable Donald Trump to 
perform simulated public diplomacy in which diplomatic messages on his Twitter generate agonistic 
rather than positive sentiments aimed at aiding his relationships with foreign publics, the axiomatic 
feature of ‘new’ public diplomacy (Mellisen, 2005). This agonism is amplified by his appropriation 
of exogenous to public diplomacy cultural codes hybridising cultural norms of diplomacy with, we 
argue, cultural codes defining carnivalesque socialities of a wrestler performing in a ring. 
 
To theorise this cultural interplay, we argue that ‘kayfabe’ is a powerful and a revealing analogue to 
Trump’s populist style and an explanandum of his simulated public diplomacy. This concept is 
associated with the World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE). Originating in the culture of carnival 
workers, its appropriation into the wrestling industry stems from a media strategy which simulates 
‘spontaneous’ events as ‘real’ (McQuarrie, 2006). By definition, kayfabe amplifies performative 
agonism. Its tactical inventory includes: disregard for codes of conduct, celebration of story-telling, 
suspension of disbelief, mediated spectacles, the theatrically antagonistic division of relations into 
‘faces’ and ‘heels’, personalised relationships, direct appeals, signifiers of brute force, limited 
persuasive abilities, and a grandiose approach to stage presence (Hunt, 2005). Further, Trump’s 
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unwillingness to pause his showmanship, or re-join the norms of diplomatic culture, mirrors the 
stricture on wrestlers never to ‘break kayfabe’. The ‘always on’ performance shapes the hyperreality 
that the publics co-create with the characters (whether they be presidents or wrestlers). 
 
Trump’s simulated public diplomacy is rich in examples of kayfabe showmanship (Hodges, 2017). 
For example, his diplomatic summits with foreign leaders become staring matches and handshake 
contests, his briefings on foreign affairs are delivered through addresses at rallies, and the 
government shutdown over a foreign policy issue becomes the equivalent of chair throwing around 
the wrestling ring. Willingness to suspend disbelief for entertainment, when transferred to the realm 
of public diplomacy, generates a rupturing ‘cultural implosion’ of simulacra derived from the 
amalgamation of bravado and hyperbole – a far cry from the relationship building dynamics that 
arguably defines ‘new’ public diplomacy. In such a setting, it is increasingly difficult to capture, or 
to follow, the functional codes of public diplomacy. Implosion arises from the erosion of meaning 
and ‘consensus reality’ through a proliferation of simulacra. Trump turns public diplomacy into a 
spectacle, simultaneously spanning the boundaries of the ‘real’, the ‘medium’, and the ‘message’.  
 
 
In answer to RQ1, our assemblage of Trump’s tweets reveals the following cultural codes in his 
simulated public diplomacy: simplified language and syntax, ‘social’ literacy, narrating the self, 
emotional amplification, faces and hills, absolutist statements, personalised relationships, media 
spectacle, fighting outside of the ring, the deal-maker, common touch, militarisation and force, and 
teams and dynasties. These signifiers of Trump’s populist style collide with the endogenous codes 
of public diplomacy. In a similar way to other leaders who use social media in public diplomacy 
(Spry, 2019), his use of his own Twitter account (@realDonaldTrump) enables personalisation 
strategies. Empowered by the platform’s affordances, he by-passes ‘old’ media, uses the stylistic 
presentation of himself as ‘authentic’ or ‘honest’ and, in addition, disregards cultural norms 
endogenous to US public diplomacy. Unlike other leaders, however, his performance in the 
traditional settings of US public diplomacy, immanentises the proliferation of exogenous cultural 
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codes - keyfabian simulacra - which collide with the officialdom of the Presidential office. 
Considering Trump’s populist style during the 2016 election campaign, described as “amateurish” 
and “de-professionalising” (Enli, 2017, p. 50), our findings reveal that his Twitter displays an adept 
hybridisation of cultural codes. Our findings are in line with Šimunjak and Caliandro’s (2019, p. 20-
22) conclusions that his tweeting is “disruptive of traditional diplomacy” and “does not accord with 
the codes and conventions of diplomatic language”. Our study, however, provides a systematisation 
of exogenous codes. Whilst they are hybridised, they are not random: they have an internal, 
disruptive logic which alters the endogenous conventions of public diplomacy practiced by the 
White House. 
 
Trump’s simulated public diplomacy does not direct itself towards the domestic in order to aid in 
the construction of a unified self-definition of the US which can then be used to clarify a vision of 
national culture to the rest of the world. Instead, Trump seeks to build a form of negative soft power 
which exposes, underlines, and encourages the deep divisions within his country in order to benefit 
from this disunity, empowering his base and the terms with which he and they look at the world. 
And this view of the world is one based on faces and heels, a constant agonistic spectacle which 
understands the domestic and the foreign within the same space. In this way, we find that the 
Trumpian simulation of public diplomacy can be understood as a state of permanent electioneering, 
or Total Campaigning, with the world as hustings venue. The globalisation and hybridisation of 
media landscape means that, for leaders such as Trump who treat all communication as self-
epideictic, there is little substantial difference between domestic or foreign politics. 
 
With regards to cultural hybridisation, our findings demonstrate noteworthy patterns in exogenous 
codes across tweets pertaining to different diplomatic targets. For example, tweets focusing on 
Venezuela display considerably more reliance upon absolutist discourse (code 9) than tweets 
concerning other diplomatic actors. Indeed, a core of the Venezuelan tweets express this absolutism 
 
34 
 
using a style and lexical markers that are distinctly endogenous, though the tradition they reference 
is biblical rather than diplomatic. Trump’s tweets about the 2016 international crisis in Venezuela 
reveal a populist style aimed to effectively resonate with his publics: a global network of foreign 
and domestic followers. It is the voice of a ‘truth from the mountaintop’ leadership style, which 
eschews the simplistic, telegraphic language we found in so many of his other tweets. Conversely, 
such absolutist discourse is downplayed in tweets pertaining to Japan. Trump shifts between 
exogenous codes, fluidly mutating public diplomacy in relation to leaders, foreign or domestic 
publics, political events, and strategic relations. Even the most dominant code that we found (code 
6, ‘simplified language and syntax’) can be de-emphasised by Trump when the strategic landscape 
demands it. 
 
Findings from the White House press releases (RQ2) reveal that, while endogenous codes continue 
to dominate over the idiosyncrasies of keyfabian-inspired ‘Trumpian’ simulation of public 
diplomacy, those codes can be easily influenced by the regular necessity to report the President’s 
direct voice. Accordingly, whilst the style enshrined in press releases on foreign affairs is formal 
and informative, the incorporation of direct quotes de-homogenises it: without the presence of 
Trump’s own reported speech, even press releases concerned with his pet diplomatic concerns are 
moderated by the ritualised codes of diplomatic civility and largely de-personalised. The 
endogenous codes of civility, transparency and dialogue implicitly manage to muffle Trump’s 
protests (Wiseman, 2005). We note that the White House moderates the voice of the President in 
foreign affairs and, arguably, plays a gate-watching role (Bruns and Highfield, 2015) in simulated 
public diplomacy, particularly targeted at ‘old’ media. Trumps’ modus operandi as a code-breaker, 
however, leads to the proliferation of keyfabian codes concomitant to the disintermediation 
affordance of Twitter, and, implicitly, yields reality-effects as opposed to media-effects. 
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Findings pertaining to RQ3 display the interplay between endogenous and exogenous codes across 
Trump’s simulated public diplomacy as an exemplar of an unprecedented cultural shift: the self-
celebratory style of populism goes beyond binary soft power leadership styles (Nye, 2014). On the 
surface level, Trump’s style is ‘personalised’ insofar as he does not communicate to foreign publics 
a separate diplomatic persona. His modus operandi is to appear ‘honest’ in the hyperreal agonism 
between populist ‘authenticity’, on the one hand, and professional diplomats and leaders 
representing ‘elites’ that his base find contemptible, on the other. Upon closer inspection, Trump’s 
‘personality cult’ can be conflated with affronts and ‘taking things personally’. The cancellation of 
his state visit to the UK in January 2018 citing “personal reasons” epitomises the theatrical pique 
that WWE wrestlers use to stoke their rivalry. For the wrestler, and for Trump, reality collapses 
down to the agonism of the ring. Adding to the notion of the ‘spectacle of the personal’, he 
addresses, or chooses to publically point fingers at, foreign leaders on Twitter consequently 
abandoning the gravitas that leaders prefer to display even in public diplomacy. While Trump’s 
simulated public diplomacy often backfires, he still dictates the codes of the hyperreality he 
constructs. Even ‘failures’ simply set the tone for further ‘angles’, because as we see in the ever-
evolving kayfabe storylines of WWE, allies one day are enemies the next.  
 
Indeed, it might be argued that the risk of failure, the possibility of damage to the reputation and 
influence of the US, and the almost violent overturning of diplomatic norms and self-presentation 
reflect a ‘truth’ also to be found in the kayfabe of wrestling. Though the show might be ‘fake’, it is 
the real risk of injury that, quite paradoxically, injects a visceral authenticity into the simulacra 
(Hunt, 2005). Blood becomes an index of authenticity and yet is itself often produced in inauthentic 
ways. So Trump’s implosion of public diplomacy norms works on his base as a manufactured sign 
of hyperrealistic authenticity. This focus on the dynamics of negative soft power (Callahan, 2015), 
with its privileging of a domestic base over appeals to foreign publics has harmful consequences for 
US statecraft, which, arguably, is indicative of the epistemic crisis of US public diplomacy. 
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Outside of Trump’s hyperreality we find no substantial referents, only vague, derivative gestures 
such as the wall as a security measure, allegations of fake news, and revisionism of trade 
agreements – all of which simply point back to themselves (Baudrillard, 2001). Trump’s delivery 
rests on codes devised for domestic publics while also serving to extend his ‘cult of personality’ for 
the perusal of foreign publics. As such, the sloganeering hype of ‘America First’ neither translates 
into the foreign affairs outcomes that Trump is seeking, nor coheres into soft power statecraft 
attracting allies to address global political issues.  
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
Trump’s confrontational style bypasses the established public diplomacy codes of conduct. His 
abandonment of these codes and his use of the demotic rhetoric of simulated codes across his 
discourse has an isolating effect on foreign publics. Trump’s approach does not yield a smoothly 
functioning practice, but co-constructs instability and uncertainty within US soft power statecraft. 
Baudrillard (2001) refers to this instability as implosion. For Baudrillard, this is the culminating 
moment of hyperreality, whereby public diplomacy accelerates towards its limits, which in this case 
are articulated by the violent incursion of cultural codes alien to public diplomacy. The intensity of 
kayfabe-inspired simulation implodes public diplomacy from within as it destroys meanings. This 
implosion swallows all energy as foreign publics struggle to make sense of Trump’s discourse on 
foreign affairs, falling further prey to the inherent entropic tendency of the field. In Trump’s foreign 
affairs, reality is denied and, as a result, all codes lose their referential value. Public diplomacy is 
diminished in its meaning-making focus and so its purpose is undermined. It becomes a hyperreal 
wrestling spectacle for the Trumpian ‘base’, constructed from the simulacra of rivalries, flexings, 
tantrums, and hyperbolic stand-offs, determinedly, and perhaps irrevocably, undermining the 
established role of public diplomacy within US soft power statecraft.  
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